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Abstract
The level of trust inherent in a society is important for a wide range of microeco-
nomic and macroeconomic outcomes. This paper investigates how individuals’ attitudes
toward social and institutional trust are shaped by the political regime in which they
live. The German reunification is a unique natural experiment that allows us to con-
duct such a study. Using data from the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) and
from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP), we obtain two sets of results.
On one side, we find that, shortly after reunification, East Germans displayed a sig-
nificantly less trusting attitude than West Germans. This suggests a negative effect
of communism in East Germany versus democracy in West Germany on social and
institutional trust. However, the experience of democracy by East Germans since re-
unification did not serve to increase levels of social trust significantly. In fact, we cannot
reject the hypothesis that East Germans, after more than a decade of democracy, have
the same levels of social distrust as shortly after the collapse of communism. In trying
to understand the underlying causes, we show that the persistence of social distrust in
the East can be explained by negative economic outcomes that many East Germans
experienced in the post-reunification period. Our main conclusion is that democracy
can foster trust in post-communist societies only when citizens’ economic outcomes are
right.
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1. Introduction
In 1990, East and West Germany were reunited after more than four decades of separation.
Before reunification, East Germans were governed by a communist regime that systemati-
cally violated the basic rights of many citizens. The freedom that people had was further
undermined by the German Democratic Republic’s State Security Service (“Stasi”). The
Stasi kept files on an estimated six million people, and built up a network of civilian in-
formants (“unofficial collaborators”), who monitored politically incorrect behavior among
other citizens. By 1995, 174,000 East Germans had been identified as unofficial collabora-
tors. This amounts to 2.5 percent of the total population between the ages of 18 and 60
(Koehler 1999) and constitutes one of the highest penetrations of any society by a secu-
rity apparatus. In fact, the ratio of “watchers” to “watched” in East Germany was even
higher than that of the Soviet Union under communism.1 Since reunification, East Ger-
mans have experienced life in a market-based democracy, an environment West Germans
had experienced since 1945.
This paper examines whether the levels of social and institutional trust have changed in
response to the reunification of Germany.2 Our main aim is to understand how individuals’
trust in other people and in legal and political institutions are shaped by the political regime
in which they live. Taking such political economy factors seriously in understanding how
trust evolves or disintegrates is important for several reasons. First, there is now widespread
evidence that social trust can have a positive impact on wide range of macroeconomic and
microeconomic outcomes (Knack and Keefer 1997, Knack and Zak 2001, Slemrod and
Katuscak 2005). Second, trust in the core institutions of a political system matters for
whether people become politically active, whether they favor policy reforms, and whether
they are willing to comply with binding decisions of policy makers (Levi and Stoker 2000).
We begin by asking whether the communist rule in East Germany affected individuals’
social and institutional trust. To investigate this, we make the identifying assumption that
East and West Germany were indistinguishable until the exogenously imposed separation
in 1945. Thus, if one observes different levels of trust between East and West Germans
shortly after reunification, one can attribute them to the opposing political, economic and
social histories in the two parts of Germany. Given that people are more ready to trust
other people and institutions if the system in which they live ensures them against breaches
of trust, and given that democracy provides exactly this kind of insurance (Sztompka 1998),
it might be expected that trust was more likely to appear under democracy in the West
1It is estimated that the Soviet Union’s KGB employed 480,000 full-time agents to oversee a nation of
280 million, which means there was one agent per 5,830 citizens. The ratio for the Stasi was one secret
policemen per 166 East Germans. When unofficial collaborators are added, there would have been one
informant watching every 66 citizens (Koehler 1999).
2When we say “social trust” we mean how much people trust each other. By “institutional trust” we
refer to citizens’ confidence in certain political authorities and institutions, such as the parliament or the
legal system.
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than under communism in the East. Using data from the German General Social Survey
(ALLBUS), this prediction is confirmed by our results. We find that individuals who lived
under communism in East Germany are much more likely to distrust other people, legal
institutions, and political authorities than individuals who lived under democracy in West
Germany.
Having established this, we then ask whether the experience of democracy by East
Germans since reunification served to increase levels of trust. Given the repressive character
of the communist rule, it might be expected that democracy encouraged trust by a process
of disassociation from the communist past. Indeed, whatever else the new democratic
environment was, it was certainly not communist or communist controlled. That, by itself,
might have created a measure of trust or, at least, a tempering of distrust (Mishler and Rose
1997). Contrary to this expectation, we obtain some striking results. The most intriguing
is that there is no significant increase of social trust among East Germans. In fact, we
cannot reject the hypothesis that East Germans, after more than a decade of democracy,
have the same levels of social distrust as shortly after the collapse of communism. Thus,
being moved from a repressive communist regime (with low collective levels of social trust)
to a liberal democratic system (with comparatively high collective levels of social trust)
does not lead to more social trust. To put it differently, there are no complementarities
between democracy per se and attitudes towards social trust in East Germany. In trying
to understand the underlying causes, we show that the culture of persistent social distrust
in the East can be explained by the economic and social inequalities that have troubled
many East Germans in the post-reunification period. Interestingly, and in sharp contrast
to social trust, we also find that the levels of institutional trust in the East significantly
converge towards those in the West.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 generates hypotheses and discusses the related
literature. Section 3 describes the data, and Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 pro-
vides further evidence using complementary data. Section 6 presents concluding remarks.
2. Hypotheses and Related Literature
The German separation and reunification is a unique natural experiment that allows schol-
ars from different disciplines to get at fascinating questions to do with economic and po-
litical systems. This paper is new primarily in investigating the impact of the separation
and reunification of Germany on trust. The first hypothesis we analyze posits that, all
other things being equal, social and institutional trust were more likely to appear under
democracy than under communism.
Hypothesis 1 East Germans who have lived under communism before reunification exhibit
less social and institutional trust than West Germans who have lived under democracy.
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Theories of why democracy has a significant trust-generating advantage over other political
systems come from a variety of sources across different disciplines. One common view is
that people are more ready to trust other people and institutions if the system in which
they live insures them against potential breaches of trust. Democratic institutions provide
precisely this kind of insurance (Sztompka 2003). This does not mean that people in the
communist states of east and central Europe did not develop networks of private contacts
among people who could help solve problems of scarce resources (Dehlhey and Newton
2002, Dallago 1990). But this took place within a wider society that was pervaded by
general suspicion and distrust created by the state. We would therefore expect the forms of
trust that developed under communism to be much more limited than the trust typically
found in democratic systems.3
The second hypothesis we analyze posits that East Germans gradually acquired similar
measures of trust as West Germans in the post-reunification period.
Hypothesis 2 The levels of social and institutional trust among East Germans converge
towards those of West Germans in the post-reunification period.
One theoretical justification for this hypothesis comes from lifetime learning models devel-
oped by political scientists (see, for example, Rose and McAllister 1990): East Germans
may have been predisposed to distrust people and institutions based on their past com-
munist experience, but the legacy of the past should be subject to periodic revision based
on contemporary experiences. So even if East Germans initially regarded other people
and institutions with the same suspicion as under communism, sooner or later one can
expect them to distinguish past and present experiences and evaluate them independently.
It is therefore not unreasonable to expect that democracy encouraged trust in the post-
reunification period by a process of disassociation from the past (Mishler and Rose 1997).
Previewing our results, it turns out that the convergence patterns of social and institutional
trust in the East are much more complex than suggested by this argument.
Ever since the contributions of Fukuyama (1995) and Putnam (1995, 1999), a lot of
thought has gone into understanding the factors that influence trust. Using data from
US localities, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) have recently shown that trust is related
to individual characteristics such as income and education, community characteristics, and
discrimination. This paper examines the extent to which trust is contingent on the political
3There is some evidence that is in line with our first hypothesis. Using data from the 1990 World
Values Survey, Ingelhart et al. (1998) find that Chinese people exhibit less trust overall than do Americans.
However, their findings do not concur with the experimental results by Buchan and Croson (2004). Their
research, based on the trust game (Berg et al. 1995), suggests higher levels of trust among people living
in China than among people living in the US. Another experimental study that is related to our paper is
that by Ockenfels and Weimann (1999). Comparing East and West Germans in a public good game and a
solidarity game, they argue that cooperation and solidarity behavior among East Germans were negatively
influenced by the political, economic and social history in the eastern part of Germany.
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regime in which people live. An understanding of this question is important, especially in
the post-communist societies of central and eastern Europe, where social and institutional
trust is vital for democratic and economic consolidation (Almond and Verba 1963, Mischler
and Rose 1997). The German reunification—with opposing political, economic and social
histories in the two parts of Germany—allows us to conduct a very well controlled analysis
of the extent of trust and distrust in a post-communist society. It also allows us to examine
the extent to which living in a democratic regime fosters social and institutional trust.
Our paper also contributes to a growing body of research that examines correlations
between political economy factors and human behavior and well-being. Besley and Ku-
damatsu (2006) examine the link between democracy and health using data from a cross
section of countries. Their findings indicate that there is a positive correlation between
democratic institutions and health policy interventions, resulting in greater life expectancy
in democracies. Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln (2005) examine whether individuals’ pref-
erences for redistributive policies are affected by the political regime in which they live.
Using the natural experiment of German reunification, they show that East Germans are
more in favor of redistribution than West Germans. The difference in preferences is shown
to be mainly a direct effect of Communism.
3. Data
Our main data source is the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS). The ALLBUS is a
biennial survey on attitudes, behavior and social structure in Germany. Each cross-section
is a nationally representative survey of the population aged 18 and above of the Federal
Republic of Germany.4 The data used in this paper come from the 1991, 1994, and 2002
ALLBUS surveys. We restrict our analysis to native Germans who were born in either the
German Democratic Republic or the Federal Republic of Germany and have finished their
general education. This leaves us with a sample of individuals who were born between 1898
and 1983.5
In 1991 and 2002, respondents were asked a question that reads: “Some people say that
most people can be trusted. Others think that one can’t be careful enough when dealing
with other people. What is your opinion about this?” As in Alesina and La Ferrara [2002],
we define as “socially trusting” those respondents who answer that “Most people can be
trusted”, and distrusting those who answer “One can’t be careful enough” or “It depends”.
Our first dependent variable, social trust, is therefore a variable which equals one if the
respondent is socially trusting, and zero otherwise. We make the interpretive assumption
that responses to the social trust question tell us about individuals’ evaluations of the
4See http://www.gesis.org/en/data service/allbus/index.htm for further information.
5We excluded individuals who indicated that they had migrated from the GDR to the FRG between
1945 and 1989. As a result, 221 respondents (around 4 percent of individuals in our final sample) were
dropped.
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external world in which they live – whether people around them behave in a trustworthy
fashion.6
Moving on from social trust to institutional trust, we make use of a question that was
asked in 1994 and 2002. It reads: “I am going to read out a number of institutions and
organizations. Please tell me for each institution or organization how much trust you place
in it. Please use the scale: 1 means you have absolutely no trust at all; 7 means you have
a great deal of trust.” We used the respondents’ evaluation of the German parliament and
legal system. Our institutional trust measures, trust in legal system and trust in parliament,
take the value one if an individual responds with a five, six or seven on the relevant seven
point scale, and zero otherwise. Our interpretive assumption is that questions about the
major representational and judicial institutions tap evaluations about the regime or system
as a whole (system-focused judgments).7
As a set of background variables which might affect a person’s social and institutional
trust, we use several socio-economic controls. We include age, age squared, year of birth,
gender, marital status, educational attainment, and employment status. Educational at-
tainment is measured by the highest completed academic qualification, and it is grouped
into three categories in ascending order: technical college entrance qualification (“Fach-
hochschulreife”) or less; higher education (“Hochschulreife”);8 and university degree. To
control for a person’s employment status, we include dummies for full time employment,
part time employment, other employment (e.g., short time work, side jobs), and non-
working. We also control for the annual state-level unemployment rate as a measure for
local labor market conditions. Finally, we include the proportion of foreigners in the pop-
ulation at the federal state level as an explanatory variable to capture differences in ethnic
composition across federal states and over time (Federal Statistical Office Germany, 2006).
Summary statistics are in the Appendix.
4. Results
We now analyze the relationship between trust and the opposing political, economic and
social histories in the two parts of Germany. We begin by running separate regressions for
6See Hardin (1993), Putnam (1999), and Alesina and Ferrara (2002) for measurement issues associated
with the social trust question used in this paper. The main argument put forward by these authors is that
trust is the product of experience and people constantly update their attitudes towards trust in response
to changing circumstances. As a result, levels of social trust in representative surveys are a good indicator
of the trustworthiness of the societies in which respondents live. The trust scores provide more information
about societies and social systems than about the personality types living in them (Putnam 1999, Dehley
and Newton 2002).
7See Levi and Stoker (2002) for measurement issues associated with institutional trust questions.
8“Fachhochschulreife” is a certificate fulfilling the entrance requirements to study at a polytechnical
college. “Hochschulreife” is a certificate entitling holders to study at university.
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each survey year. The model we estimate is a latent probit regression of the form:
y∗i = φ1Easti + φ2Xi + ǫi with trusti =
{
1 if y∗i > 0
0 if y∗i 6 0
, (1)
where y∗i is the latent variable and trusti represents one of the three trust outcomes: social
trust, trust in the legal system, or trust in the parliament. The Easti dummy is the variable
of main interest. It captures people who lived under communism in East Germany before
1990. The vector Xi comprises a set of individual socio-economic controls and a constant.
The error term ǫi is NID(0, σ
2) and captures all other omitted characteristics.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Figure 1 illustrates our basic results. While the regressions include a set of basic controls,
the figure only reports marginal effects for the East dummy. We first look at the data that
were collected immediately after reunification in 1991 (social trust) and 1994 (institutional
trust). For all trust questions, the estimates suggest that eastern respondents displayed
a significantly less trusting attitude than did western respondents. Indeed, the estimated
coefficients on the East dummy are significant at 0.1 percent for all trust questions. The
results are also quantitatively important: the incidence of social trust was roughly 11
percent lower for East Germans than for West Germans; trust in the legal system was
20 percent lower; and trust in the parliament was 12 percent lower. These first results
suggest that people who have lived on average more than 30 years under communism are
much more likely to distrust other people and political institutions than people who have
lived in a democracy. Our next step is to examine the extent to which the levels of trust
in the East have changed in the post-reunification period. To do so, we compare the
data that were collected in 2002 with that from shortly after reunification. Our idea is
that by 2002 the democratic regime has existed long enough for many eastern respondents
to differentiate contemporary experiences from those of the communist past and to form
judgments about the differences. We find that the incidence of institutional distrust in the
East decreased roughly by between 37 percent (trust in parliament) and 49 percent (trust
in legal system) between 1994 and 2002. This suggests that the levels of institutional trust
in the East converge quite strongly towards those in the West. Indeed, assuming that the
complete cycle of convergence is linear, we can expect full uniformity of institutional trust
between East and West Germans roughly 19 to 24 years after reunification, depending on
the institutional trust question.
In sharp contrast to institutional trust, there seems to be a persistent culture of social
distrust surviving among East Germans in spite of fundamental democratic transformations
since reunification. Indeed, the incidence of social distrust decreased by only 26 percent
between 1991 and 2002, and one would expect the full circle of convergence to be around
42 years. So to get rid of pre-existing social distrust, which is a legacy of the communist
past, will require roughly two generations.
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In Table 2 we pool the data to examine in greater detail the patterns of trust that can
be found in the two parts of Germany. The model we estimate is a probit regression of the
form:
y∗i = τ + ϕ1Easti + ϕ2(Easti × τ) + ϕ3Xi + ǫi with trusti =
{
1 if y∗i > 0
0 if y∗i 6 0
, (2)
where trusti is one of the trust outcome variables for individual i, and τ is a year dummy
variable which is one in the year 2002, and zero otherwise. The East∗Year02 interaction
term tells us how East Germans have changed their attitudes towards trust in the post-
reunification period. It thus represents a rough measure of convergence in post-communist
East Germany (Alesina and Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln 2005). Table 1 shows the results for (2). The
coefficients on the East dummy indicate that East Germans are significantly less likely to
trust other people, the legal system, and the parliament than West Germans. This is in
line with our findings for (1). The main set of results concerns the change in trust of East
Germans in the post-reunification period, which is captured by the interaction between
being from the East and the 2002 dummy (East∗Year02). The intriguing coefficient is
that on the social trust outcome: it is positive but statistically insignificant. This means
that, contrary to what has been stipulated in hypothesis 2, we actually cannot reject the
hypothesis that East Germans have the same levels of social distrust as shortly after the
collapse of communism. A different argument applies to institutional trust: the coefficients
on the two institutional trust questions are positive and statistically significant at 0.1
percent (trust in legal system) and 5 percent (trust in parliament) and larger in magnitude
compared to social trust. This suggest that the levels of institutional trust of East Germans
significantly converge towards those of West Germans.9
[Table 1 about here.]
As for the socio-economic controls, social trust increases with age; a woman is less likely
to be socially trusting than a man; education is positively correlated with both social and
institutional trust; marital status is not significantly correlated with trust. These patterns
are consistent with the findings of Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) for the United States. In
unreported regressions, we also distinguished between four different cohort groups: born
after 1965, born between 1946 and 1965, born between 1931 and 1945, and born on or
before 1930. We found that older birth cohorts are not significantly more distrusting than
9In unreported regressions, we also examined alternative institutional trust measures, such as trust into
the police force or trust in the highest constitutional court. Results for these alternative outcome measures
were in line with the ones reported here and are available from the authors upon request. In addition, we
estimated ordered probit models. With respect to social trust, we distinguished between three responses in
ascending order: (1) one can’t be to careful enough; (2) it depends; and (3) most people can be trusted.
As for the institutional trust measures, we used the seven point scale from the original ALLBUS questions.
All the results from ordered probit regressions were qualitatively equivalent to the ones obtained from the
latent probit regressions.
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younger birth cohorts in the East. This finding might seem counterintuitive at first. Indeed,
it may not be unreasonable to expect that individuals who have lived their entire live under
communism are less trusting than individuals who have only spent their childhood or early
adolescence under communism. However, recent research by Dohmen et al. (2006) suggests
that parents pass on their attitudes towards trust to their children. So individuals who
have only spend their childhood or early adolescence under communism may be just as
distrusting as older birth cohorts because of the intergenerational transmission of trust
attitudes. We also re-estimated our model by including variables that capture the religious
affiliation of the respondent, controlled for the presence and number of children in the
household and the number of adult household members. We found that including these
variables did not change the estimates.
The result that stands out is that the democracy experience of East Germans since
1991 did not have a significant positive effect on attitudes towards social trust. In our next
exercise, we try to pinpoint the forces that may have kept social trust levels low in the East.
Our hypothesis is that East Germans gained several, if sharply different, kinds of freedom
after reunification. On one side, there was the freedom to enjoy civil and political liberties.
But reunification also brought with it a new economic environment build on competition
and personal achievement. It is well understood that the economic aspects of reunification
turned out to be difficult. For example, the unemployment rate in East Germany almost
doubled between 1991 and 2004 from around 10 percent to 20 percent (Snower and Merkl
2006). It is therefore interesting to examine whether the pattern of non-converging social
trust in the East is attributable to the negative economic effects often associated with
reunification. To do so, we partition the population of East Germans into three different
subgroups, {(Female/Male),(Unemployed/NotUnemp),(LowEcoStat/HighEcoStat)}. The
first partition distinguishes East Germans by gender. The second partition distinguishes
East Germans interviewed in 2002 by whether they have experienced unemployment in the
last 10 years or not. Finally, the third partition distinguishes East Germans interviewed in
2002 by whether they report being in a bad (or very bad) economic situation or in a good
(or very good) economic situation. Distinguishing respondents by subgroups allows us to
shed some light on whether there exist heterogeneity in the evolution of trust among East
Germans. For each trust measure, we estimate three equations of the form:
y∗i = τ + ψ1Easti + ψ2 (Easti × τ × Iρ) + ψ3 (Easti × τ × (1− Iρ)) + ψ4Xi + ǫi (3)
with
trusti =
{
1 if y∗i > 0
0 if y∗i 6 0
.
The variable Iρ is an indicator that takes the value 1 if the respondent falls in one of the
three subgroups {Female,Unemployed,LowEcoStat}, and is zero otherwise. The results for
(3) are collected in Table 2. We start by discussing the social trust outcomes in columns
(1) to (3). We first examine whether East German men and women exhibit different
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convergence patterns. Such an examination is interesting because it is widely perceived
that the social and economic position of East German women disproportionately worsened
after reunification. For example, many women in the East have seen the erosion of equal
pay, job opportunities, and widely available affordable childcare. As a result, many East
German women were forced to return to traditional gender roles (Alsop 2000). If gender
equality is important for how much women trust other people, one might expect East
German women to exhibit different convergence patterns in the post-reunification period
than East German men. This hypothesis is confirmed by our results: the coefficient on
East German women is small (0.023) and statistically insignificant meaning that women
in the East are almost as distrusting as they were shortly after reunification; in contrast,
the coefficient on East German men is much larger (0.076) and statistically significant at
5 percent, implying that the social trust levels of men in the East converge towards those
in the West.
[Table 2 about here.]
Second, we look at whether convergence in trust is driven by adverse employment
shocks. Strikingly, we find that East Germans who experienced unemployment in the post-
reunification period have become even more distrusting than they were shortly after the
collapse of communism, although the negative coefficient on East∗Year02∗Unemployment (-
0.009) is not statistically significant. In contrast, the trust levels of those who did not expe-
rience unemployment converge towards western levels with the estimated coefficient (0.080)
being significant at 5 percent. Third, East Germans who currently consider themselves to be
in a good economic situation have significantly changed their attitudes towards social trust
since reunification. Indeed, the coefficient on the interaction East∗Year02∗HighEconStat is
positive (0.098) and statistically significant at 1 percent. In contrast, East Germans who
report being in a bad economic situation are currently as distrusting as they were shortly
after the collapse of communism since the coefficient on East∗Year02∗LowEconStat is small
(0.015) and statistically insignificant.10 In sum, the results suggest that the transition to
democracy did not uniformly foster social trust in East Germany. There exists considerable
heterogeneity in the evolution of social trust across different subgroups of the population.
Indeed, East Germans who suffered economically from reunification are presently as dis-
trusting as they were shortly after the collapse of communism. However, when exposure to
democracy was coupled with personal economic success, then the experience of democracy
in post-reunification period lead to significantly more individual social trust.
The above discussion concerns the extent to which East Germans have change their at-
titudes towards social trust since reunification. On the aggregate level, we have shown that
there is a culture of persistent social distrust in the East. On disaggregating we found this
10Note that the coefficients across the three different subgroups are statistically different from each other
at the 10 percent level. Equality p-values from the χ2 statistic are provided at the bottom of Table 2.
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phenomenon to be driven by the negative socio-economic outcomes that many East Ger-
mans experienced in the post-reunification period. Columns (4) to (6) in Table 2 show that
trust in the parliament follows a pattern similar to the one found for social trust. Indeed,
East Germans belonging to the subgroups {Male,NotUnemployed,HighEcoStat} are cur-
rently putting significantly more trust in the parliament than they did shortly after reuni-
fication in 1994; but those belonging to the subgroups {Female,Unemployed,LowEcoStat}
have not significantly changed their attitudes toward the parliament. In contrast, trust
in the legal system follows a very different pattern. To see this, consider the estimates in
equations (7) to (9) in Table 2. All coefficients are positive, statistically significant, and
have similar magnitudes across the different subgroups. This means that the levels of legal
trust uniformly converge toward western levels across the differen subgroups of the East
German population. This, in turn, implies that personal socio-economic characteristics are
not the basis by which East Germans have re-evaluated their attitudes toward the legal
system. One possible explanation is as follows. The guarantee of civil rights may be taken
for granted in established democracies, but East Germans were accustomed to state inter-
ference with many aspects of private life, from the practice of religion, to the right to travel,
to the right of freedom of speech or the freedom of forming and joining organizations. It
is therefore conceivable that the removal of restrictions on personal freedom and increased
opportunities for citizen participation have significantly increased trust in the legal system,
with only a small countervailing negative effect of personal socio-economic deprivation.
5. Further Evidence
This section presents further evidence using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(SOEP). The SOEP is a household panel survey representative of the German population
resident in private households. In 1984, this longitudinal survey began interviewing a
national sample of approximately 6,000 households in the Federal Republic of Germany.
In 1990, the SOEP was expanded to the territory of the German Democratic Republic.11
As with the ALLBUS sample selection, we restrict our sample to Germans born between
1898 and 1983 who have finished their general education and have lived in East or West
Germany in 1989.
There are advantages and disadvantages to using data from the SOEP to complement
our previous findings. As for the disadvantages, the SOEP survey does not include questions
on individual’s trust in political and legal institutions. The absence of such questions limits
our attention to social trust. Moreover, the SOEP asked specific social trust questions only
at one point in time, namely in 2003. Of course, the results of a single survey wave cannot
identify time trends. However, the data allows us to look for different levels of social
trust between East and West Germans more than a decade after the democratic transition
started. Hence the results we obtain provide a basis for informed speculation about the
11See http://www.diw.de/english/sop/ for further information about the SOEP.
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long-term effects of communism in East Germany versus democracy in the West on social
trust.
As for the advantages, the SOEP allows us to draw inferences from very large sample
sizes. Moreover, the measurement of social trust in the SOEP differs from the traditional
trust question used in the ALLBUS, which asked whether “people can be trusted” or
whether one “can’t be too careful in dealing with people”. The SOEP asked respondents to
indicate on a four point-scale (“totally agree”, “slightly agree”, “disagree slightly”, “totally
disagree”) to what extent they agree with the following three statements: “on the whole one
can trust people”; “nowadays one can’t rely on anyone”; “if one is dealing with strangers,
it is better to be careful before one can trust them”. The behavioral relevance of these
trust measures have been validated in a field experiment with individuals representative
of the adult population living in Germany (Fehr et al. 2003). In the study by Fehr et al.
(2003), 429 individuals first completed a questionnaire that contained the same three trust
questions that were asked in in the SOEP questionnaire in 2003. The individuals then
played a modified version of the trust game developed by Berg et al. (2005). The results
by Fehr et al. (2003) indicate that survey responses to the trust questions in the 2003 wave
of the SOEP actually predict trusting behavior in the trust game. That is, individuals who
trusted others according to their survey responses also acted, in the game, in a trusting
way. This suggests that the three trust indicators in the 2003 wave of the SOEP provide a
behaviorally relevant measure of how trusting individuals are.
We construct three dichotomous social trust measures. The first variable, trust people,
takes the value one if the respondent agrees (“totally agrees” or “slightly agrees”) with
the statement “on the whole one can trust people”, and zero otherwise. The second, can’t
trust, equals one if the respondent agrees with the statement “nowadays one can’t rely on
anyone”, and zero otherwise. The third outcome, distrust strangers, takes the value one
if the respondent agrees with the statement “if one is dealing with strangers, it is better
to be careful before one can trust them”, and zero otherwise. As background variables
which might affect a person’s social trust, we control for socio-economic variables similar
to the ones we used for the data from the ALLBUS.12 Moreover, the SOEP also allows us
to control for potentially important socio-economic variables that were not available in the
ALLBUS. It is well known that there exist considerable differences in household income,
earnings, and wealth between East and West Germans (Go¨rzig et al. 2004, Kohli 1999).
12However, there are two differences. The first difference lies in the definition of a person’s employment
status. The SOEP data allows us to include dummies to control for full time employment, part time
employment, registered as being unemployed, and economic inactivity. The second difference lies in the
definition of a person’s educational attainment. The SOEP distinguishes between three educational out-
comes: (1) less than high school; (2) completed high school; and (3) more than high school. The second
category includes individuals with a degree giving access to university studies (“Hochschulreife”), a certifi-
cate of aptitude for specialized short-course higher education (“Fachhochschulreif”), an apprenticeship, or
a specialized vocational education (“Berufsfachschule”).
12
To account for these differences, we also control for post-government household income and
homeownership as proxies for individual wealth.
[Table 3 about here.]
Table 3 reports the results for the three social trust measures regressed against the East
dummy and controls. In line with previous estimates, East Germans display significantly
lower levels of social trust than West Germans. Consider first the models which control
for variables similar to the ones we used for the data from the ALLBUS [equations (1),
(3), and (5)]. The results can be interpreted as follows. More than a decade after the
collapse of communism, an East German is 7 percent less likely to “trust people” than a
West German, 8 percent more likely “not to rely on anyone”, and roughly 3 percent more
likely to “distrust strangers”. The other significant estimates are as expected: education is
positively associated with trust, being economically “unsuccessful” in terms of labor market
outcomes is negatively correlated with trust, and the occurrence of past misfortunes such
as a divorce or separation weakens trust. Investigating the robustness of the results by
adding household income and homeownership to the set of controls [equations (2), (4), and
(6)] shows that our main estimates do not change much in significance and magnitude.13
The coefficients on income and homeownership are as expected and confirm the common
view that “haves” are significantly more trusting than “have-nots” (Putnam 1999).
In Table 4 we partition the East German population into economically advantaged and
disadvantaged groups, and test a model similar to the one in Table 2.14 The variables
Unemployed and NotUnemployed are dummies indicating whether or not a respondent
is currently registered as unemployed. The variables EcoWorry and NoEcoWorry are
dummies indicating whether or not a respondent is very concerned about his own economic
situation or. Our attempt at distinguishing types of groups provides some empirical support
for the conjecture that low levels of social trust in the East can be mainly attributed to
personal economic deprivation.
[Table 4 about here.]
First, the extent to which an East German is less trusting than a West German appears not
to be contingent on gender. However, there exist clear differences in social trust according
13We also explored the effects of several other possible determinants of social trust which are not reported
here for reasons of space. We included additional proxies for individual wealth such as whether the respon-
dent has financial assets, received an inheritance or gift in the past, or expects an inheritance or gift in the
future. We also included the number of years the respondent lived at the current address and controlled
for religious affiliation (Alesina and La Ferrara 2003). Including these additional covariates did not change
our main results.
14Note, however, that Table 4 investigates whether trust levels are heterogenous across different groups
of the East German population at one point in time (in 2003). In contrast, Table 2 examines whether
convergence of trust is heterogenous across different groups of the East German population in the post-
reunification period.
13
to individuals’ economic circumstances. East Germans who report not being concerned
about their own economic situation (East∗NoEcoWorry) are not significantly less trusting
than West Germans. However, those who report being very concerned about their economic
situation (East∗EcoWorry) are on average between 3 percentage points (distrust strangers)
and 16 percentage points (trust people, can’t trust) less trusting than Westerners, with
the coefficients being significant at either 1 percent or 0.1 percent. Distinguishing between
employed (East∗NotUnemployed) and unemployed (East∗Unemployed) adults living in East
Germany yields results that are qualitatively similar. Thus, we conclude that the long-term
effect of communism on social trust is not homogenous across different groups of the East
German population: East Germans who did not experience negative economic outcomes in
the post-reunification period display trust patterns that are not too dissimilar from West
Germans. In contrast, East Germans who received negative economic shocks are presently
much less trusting than West Germans.
6. Conclusion
We find that communism in East Germany had a strong negative effect on individuals’ social
and institutional trust. However, the transition to democracy per se did not foster social
trust. Indeed, East Germans who suffered economically from reunification are presently
almost as distrusting as they were shortly after the collapse of communism. However, when
exposure to democracy was coupled with personal economic success, then democracy lead
to significantly more social trust. Overall, our results suggest that political economy factors
need to be taken seriously in understanding how trust evolves and disintegrates.
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Figures
Figure 1: By how much is an East German less likely to
trust other people and institutions than a West German?
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Notes: Estimates are marginal effects from probit regressions com-
puted at the average values of all variables used. ∗∗∗ denotes signifi-
cance at 0.1 percent, ∗∗ at 1 percent, and ∗ at 5 percent. Non-reported
controls included in each regression are: age, age squared, and female.
18
Tables
Table 1: Did East Germans change their attitudes
towards trust in the post-reunification period (ALL-
BUS)?
.
Equation 1 2 3
Dependent variable Social Trust Trust in legal system Trust in parliament
East -0.089∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗∗
[0.025] [0.033] [0.027]
Year02 -0.048 -0.021 -0.092
[0.121] [0.128] [0.107]
East∗Year02 0.049 0.129∗∗∗ 0.070∗
[0.026] [0.031] [0.030]
Age 0.016 -0.014 0.014
[0.011] [0.016] [0.014]
(Age2)/100 -0.008∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.003
[0.002] [0.003] [0.003]
Year of birth 0.007 0.001 0.014
[0.011] [0.016] [0.013]
Female -0.038∗∗∗ -0.016 -0.011
[0.011] [0.015] [0.013]
Single -0.001 -0.021 0.007
[0.017] [0.022] [0.019]
Divorced -0.034 -0.035 -0.039
[0.020] [0.029] [0.024]
Separated 0.041 -0.047 -0.036
[0.048] [0.055] [0.047]
Widowed 0.035 0.037 -0.031
[0.028] [0.033] [0.026]
Higher education 0.113∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
[0.023] [0.026] [0.025]
University degree 0.106∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗ 0.064∗∗
[0.022] [0.025] [0.023]
Part time -0.017 -0.042 -0.023
[0.024] [0.031] [0.026]
Other work -0.026 -0.046 -0.025
[0.022] [0.034] [0.029]
Nonworking -0.015 -0.011 0.004
[0.014] [0.018] [0.016]
Local unemployment rate -0.003 -0.012∗∗∗ -0.001
[0.002] [0.003] [0.003]
Ethnic fragmentation -0.001 -0.003 -0.002
0.002 0.003 0.003
Pseudo-R2 0.05 0.03 0.03
Observed probability 0.18 0.42 0.25
Predicted probability 0.17 0.42 0.25
Log-likelihood value -2,124.58 -3,334.00 -2,776.18
Observations 4,711 5,057 5,032
Notes: Estimates are marginal effects from probit regressions computed at the average
values of all variables used. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 0.1 percent, ∗∗ at 1 percent,
and ∗ at 5 percent. Reference categories are: West German, male, married, technical
college entrance qualification or less, full-time employed.
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Table 2: How can we explain the persistence of social
distrust in East Germany in the post-reunification pe-
riod (ALLBUS)?
Equation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Dependent Variable Social trust Trust in parliament Trust in legal system
East*Year02*Female 0.023 0.050 0.122∗∗∗
[0.029] [0.034] [0.036]
East*Year02*Male 0.076∗ 0.092∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗
[0.032] [0.035] [0.036]
East*Year02*Unemployeda -0.009 0.026 0.142∗∗
[0.036] [0.045] [0.048]
East*Year02*NotUnemployeda 0.080∗ 0.098∗ 0.135∗∗
[0.036] [0.041] [0.042]
East*Year02*LowEcoStatb 0.015 0.033 0.103∗∗
[0.028] [0.032] [0.035]
East*Year02*HighEcoStatb 0.098∗∗ 0.125∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗
[0.035] [0.038] [0.035]
Equality p-valuec 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.23 0.14 0.01 0.67 0.89 0.12
Observations 4,711 3,704 4,711 5,032 4,041 5,032 5,057 4,050 5,057
Notes: aDummies indicating whether an East German interviewed in 2002 has experienced unemployment in the
last 10 years or not. bDummies indicating whether an East German interviewed in 2002 reports being in a bad
or very bad (good or very good) economic situation. cFigures are equality p-values from χ2-statistic. ∗∗∗ denotes
significance at 0.1 percent, ∗∗ at 1 percent, and ∗ at 5 percent. Non-reported covariates are as in Table 1.
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Table 3: By how much is an East German less likely
to be socially trusting than a West German in 2003
(SOEP)?
Equation 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent Variable Trust people Can’t trust Distrust strangers
East -0.068∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.026∗ 0.022
[0.018] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.012] [0.012]
Age -0.002 -0.002 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
(Age2)/100 0.004∗ 0.004∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.002
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
Female 0.008 0.008 -0.009 -0.008 0.013∗∗ 0.013∗∗
[0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.005] [0.005]
Single -0.004 0.014 -0.012 -0.029∗ -0.019∗ -0.025∗∗
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.009] [0.009]
Divorced -0.085∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ 0.021 -0.003 -0.021 -0.030∗
[0.016] [0.017] [0.016] [0.016] [0.011] [0.012]
Separated -0.080∗∗ -0.054 0.044 0.020 -0.060∗∗ -0.070∗∗
[0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] [0.023] [0.024]
Widowed -0.023 -0.008 -0.015 -0.030 0.001 -0.006
[0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.018] [0.012] [0.012]
Completed high school 0.073∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.014 -0.012
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.008] [0.008]
More than high school 0.143∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗
[0.013] [0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.012] [0.012]
Part time 0.014 0.018 -0.029∗∗ -0.033∗∗ -0.022∗∗ -0.024∗∗
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.008] [0.008]
Unemployed -0.096∗∗∗ -0.080∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗ 0.023∗
[0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.017] [0.009] [0.010]
Inactive -0.030∗ -0.016 0.038∗∗ 0.026∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.017∗
[0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.008] [0.008]
Local unemployment rate -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002∗ -0.002∗
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Ethnic fragmentation 0.004∗ 0.005∗∗ -0.003 -0.004∗ -0.001 -0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
(Household income)/10000 0.013∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗
[0.003] [0.003] [0.001]
Homeownership 0.026∗∗ -0.027∗∗ -0.006
[0.010] [0.010] [0.006]
Pseudo-R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
Observed probability 0.61 0.61 0.43 0.43 0.89 0.89
Predicted probability 0.61 0.61 0.43 0.43 0.89 0.89
Log-likelihood value -10,658.42 -10,631.09 -10,860.52 -10,837.12 -5,713.20 -5,705.21
Observations 16,256 16,232 16,262
Notes: Estimates are marginal effects from probit regressions computed at the average values of all
variables used. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 0.1 percent, ∗∗ at 1 percent, and ∗ at 5 percent. Reference
categories for non-scaled variables are: West German, male, married, less than high school, full-time
employed. Standard errors are adjusted for clusters at the current household number.
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Table 4: How can we explain low levels of social trust
in East Germany in 2003 (SOEP)?
Equation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Dependent Variable Trust people Can’t trust Distrust strangers
East*Female -0.055∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.025∗
[0.019] [0.020] [0.011]
East*Male -0.055∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.018
[0.020] [0.020] [0.012]
East*Unemployeda -0.115∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.032∗
[0.027] [0.027] [0.015]
East*NotUnemployeda -0.050∗∗ 0.061∗∗ 0.020
[0.019] [0.019] [0.012]
East*EcoWorryb -0.153∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗
[0.022] [0.022] [0.012]
East*NoEcoWorryb -0.016 0.032 0.018
[0.019] [0.020] [0.012]
Equality p-valued 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.17 0.19
Observations 16,256 16,256 16,182 16,232 16,232 16,159 16,262 16,262 16,189
Notes: aDummies indicating whether or not respondent is currently registered as unemployed. bDummies indi-
cating whether or not respondent is currently very concerned about his economic situation. dFigures are equality
p-values from χ2-statistic. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 0.1 percent, ∗∗ at 1 percent, and ∗ at 5 percent. Non-
reported covariates are as in Table 3 including household income and homeownership.
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Table 5: Summary statistics for the dependent vari-
ables (ALLBUS).
.
Dependent Variable Social trust Trust legal system Trust parliament
Sample East West East West East West
1991/1994a 0.099 0.204 0.275 0.477 0.150 0.274
2002 0.163 0.242 0.376 0.472 0.232 0.310
Notes:
aSocial trust is observed in 1991 and institutional trust is observed in 1994.
23
Table 6: Summary statistics for the independent vari-
ables (ALLBUS).
.
Dependent Variable Social trust Trust in legal system
Sample East Germany West Germany East Germany West Germany
Year 1991 2002 1991 2002 1994 2002 1994 2002
Age 43.22 44.66 43.55 46.29 44.89 44.52 44.42 46.25
[15.23] [16.28] [17.10] [16.32] [16.16] [16.20] [16.70] [16.31]
Female 0.524 0.504 0.528 0.511 0.510 0.501 0.493 0.510
Married 0.694 0.564 0.601 0.595 0.660 0.567 0.608 0.594
Single 0.143 0.276 0.244 0.262 0.167 0.278 0.243 0.262
Divorced 0.093 0.081 0.052 0.067 0.076 0.080 0.054 0.069
Separated 0.008 0.016 0.016 0.021 0.015 0.015 0.013 0.021
Widowed 0.062 0.062 0.087 0.055 0.081 0.060 0.083 0.054
No higher education 0.838 0.773 0.817 0.767 0.844 0.770 0.848 0.764
Higher education 0.060 0.110 0.107 0.123 0.060 0.112 0.082 0.123
University degree 0.102 0.116 0.076 0.110 0.096 0.118 0.070 0.112
Full time 0.532 0.520 0.471 0.474 0.527 0.523 0.521 0.475
Part time 0.029 0.034 0.069 0.076 0.051 0.034 0.071 0.075
Other work 0.129 0.029 0.046 0.064 0.024 0.028 0.053 0.064
Nonworking 0.310 0.417 0.415 0.386 0.399 0.416 0.356 0.386
Local Unemployment 0.156 0.172 0.068 0.080 0.172 0.172 0.093 0.080
[0.017] [0.028] [0.026] [0.026] [0.023] [0.028] [0.017] [0.026]
Ethnic Fragmentation 0.016 0.034 0.088 0.099 0.023 0.034 0.099 0.094
[0.026] [0.031] [0.025] [0.023] [0.028] [0.031] [0.025] [0.023]
Observations 1,259 791 1,208 1,453 970 788 1,839 1,460
Notes: Standard deviations for continuous variables in brackets. Means on the sample
‘trust in parliament’ are similar to the ones reported for the sample ‘trust in legal system’.
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Table 7: Summary statistics for the dependent vari-
ables (SOEP 2003).
.
Dependent Variable Trust people Can’t trust Distrust strangers
Sample East West East West East West
2003 0.537 0.642 0.487 0.403 0.895 0.881
Observations 5,125 11,131 5,126 11,106 5,130 11,132
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Table 8: Summary statistics for the independent vari-
ables (SOEP 2003).
.
Sample East Germany West Germany
Age 48.16 50.01
[16.82] [16.72]
Female 0.525 0.522
Married 0.585 0.638
Single 0.240 0.196
Divorced 0.082 0.070
Separated 0.021 0.016
Widowed 0.072 0.079
Less than high school 0.080 0.169
Completed high school 0.731 0.627
More than high school 0.189 0.204
Full time 0.408 0.390
Part time 0.147 0.212
Unemployed 0.135 0.044
Economic Inactive 0.310 0.353
Local Unemployment 0.192 0.097
[0.032] [0.025]
Ethnic Fragmentation 0.037 0.099
[0.032] [0.021]
Household Income 28,832 36,247
[15,000] [22,636]
Homeownership 0.427 0.594
Observations 5,130 11,132
Notes: Standard deviations for continuous variables in
brackets. Household income is annual post-government
income and is expressed in Euros.
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